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Introduction
The mining and metals (M&M)1 sector has with regard to tax, as indeed with respect to other
aspects of its existence, a dual character, being made up of miners and metal producers, usually
in the guise of juridically independent enterprises.2 The two sub-sectors often have different
interests and difficulties. Both claim to be harshly treated by the taxation system, with it being
said that the M&M sector bears a tax burden double that of the economy as a whole, with the
miners burden being double that of the metal producers.3 Further, it is claimed, an enterprise in
the Russian M&M sector bears a tax burden double that of the typical Western M&M firm.4
The miners claim to suffer from liability to a range of particular taxes related to their resource
exploitation activities as well as heavy liability to assets tax. The difficulties claimed by the
metal producers are based on their VAT liability at each stage of a multi-stage production proc-
ess; they also find themselves subject to the sudden imposition of export duties. The claimed
difficulties of the M&M sector can be seen in the context of the general discussion of whether
the resource sector is the milk cow or wolf of the Russian economy. That discussion is generally
focused on the oil and gas sector, but the complaints of the M&M sector of an unfair tax burden,
on the one hand, and accusations of massive tax evasion and capital flight against the sector, on
the other, suggest that it is not an irrelevant issue here.
The main tasks, therefore, in the first part of this paper, dealing with taxation in the M&M sec-
tor in the 1990s, is to examine relative tax rates in the two branches of the sector; the specific
issues of the VAT and export duty liabilities of metal producers and the resource taxes faced by
the miners; the tax evasion issue among metal producers, something generally although not
always related to their export activities; and finally whether or not the M&M sector is being
exploited through the tax system as part of a general exploitation of the resource sector. These
questions will necessarily be approached with a degree of vagueness, given the paucity, incon-
sistency and uncertain reliability of the data.
The second part of the paper will deal with efforts at tax reform since Putin came to the presi-
dency, including an account of lobbying by the M&M sector within the tax reform process. This
part of the paper will have to be open-ended, since some of the most important changes for the
M&M sector had not been implemented or taken effect at the time this paper was written.
                                                     
1 The Russian usage is metallurgicheskaia promyshlennost, the direct translation of which is the misleading metal-
lurgical industry. The sector includes enterprises dealing in activities ranging from mining and benefication to the
production of metal of all stages of completion. The analysis here does not include precious or nuclear-related metals.
2 Although on merger and acquisition activities across the boundary between the two sub-sectors, usually in the form
of metal producers buying major shareholdings in miners, see Fortescue, Stephen: The Russian mining and metals
sector: integration or disintegration?, in Tikhomirov, Vladimir (ed.): Anatomy of the 1998 Russian Crisis, Contempo-
rary European Research Center, University of Melbourne, 1999, chapter 8.
3 Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 7-8, 1998, p. 4; Delovoi mir, 6 August 1996, p. 4; Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt, no. 2, 1999,
p. 15; Metally Evrazii, no. 3, 2000, p. 7.
4 Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 3-4, 1997, p. 7.
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The tax burden of the M&M sector in transition
Levels of tax
Table 1 shows average tax rates within the M&M sector as a percentage of GDP compared to
the economy as a whole.5 The table shows the sector as being more lightly taxed than the econ-
omy as a whole as transition got underway, but with a steadily and massively widening gap
operating against the metals sector as the decade continued. Data for 1999 indicate that taxes
represented 60% of GDP in the mining sector, 50% among metal producers, and 35-40% in
industry (not the economy) as a whole.6
Table 1. M&M and economy-wide tax takes as a percentage of gross domestic product
Source: Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 5-6, 1997, p. 8.
Table 2 shows tax takes as a percentage of realized production for metals producers and for
miners. Again the mining sector is worse off. In 1997 the figure for the economy as a whole was
10-15.7
Table 2. Tax takes as a percentage of realized production
Mining Metals
1990 12
1994 25.4 12.7
1995 34.0 19.0
1997 22.0
Sources: Metally Evrazii, no. 3, 1996, p.5; no. 4, 1996, p. 5; no. 5, 1998, p. 9.
The data in the tables appear to broadly confirm industry claims of a significant tax bias against
the M&M sector, in particular the miners. The sector complains bitterly not just of the level of
taxation that it has to pay, but also of the bewildering number and variety of taxes. The follow-
ing list gives an indication of taxes to be paid by M&M sector enterprises before the tax reform
of 2000/01. Most are controversial and will be described in more detail below.
• Value-added tax
• Profits tax
• Assets tax
• Resource and environmental levies
− raw materials replenishment levy
− resource royalties
− road and transport taxes
− tailings tax
                                                     
5 For other data presenting a similar picture, see Metally Evrazii, no. 6, 1997, p. 24; no. 5, 1998, p. 9.
6 Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 1-2, 2000, p. 12.
7 Metally Evrazii, no. 5, 1998, p. 9.
Year Whole economy M&M sector
1990 34.4 38.2
1991 33.2 27.8
1992 41.4 29.7
1993 48.2 30.6
1994 29.0 55.9
1995 26.1 62.9
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• Social fund payments
− pension fund
− social insurance fund
− federal employment fund
− compulsory health insurance
• Export duties
• Local and regional taxes
It is worth pointing out that despite the sectors claims of special tax mistreatment, the sector is
not seen as a major tax defaulter.8 Table 3 provides data on tax arrears as of 1 January 1999.
The sectors indebtedness generally stands at less than 4% of total tax indebtedness, both at
regional and federal levels. This can be compared to the fuel sectors 21.71% of indebtedness in
1997 (at a time when the metal sector held 5.79% of tax indebtedness).9
Table 3. Tax indebtedness as of 1 January 1999, billion roubles
Source: Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 3-4, 1999, p. 12
One would have hoped to be able to present data showing the distribution of the overall tax
burden between different types of tax, particularly in comparison to economy-wide data, in or-
der to evaluate sectoral claims of tax discrimination. Unfortunately the available data are too
inconsistent over time and between categories to be of much value in tabular form. One is deal-
ing either with rouble payments over periods of very high inflation or percentages where differ-
ent combinations of taxes are included in the totals. Some data include only federal taxes, others
all taxes. In recent times VAT payments are particularly distorted in official statistics since de-
lays in government VAT refunds on exports can leave minus signs in front of those particular
figures. This can be seen in official governments data for the year ending 1 January 2000. The
metals sectors VAT payments are shown as minus RUR 4,738,430,000.10 This was at a time
when the tax authorities were deliberately withholding VAT repayments to those they consid-
ered to be false exporters and their intermediaries, many of whom are to be found in the met-
als sector.11 The negative in the VAT column makes it impossible to calculate and compare
percentages from that data.
With these difficulties very much in mind, two tables are nevertheless presented and carefully
interpreted. On the basis of these and other data each category of tax will be examined. In doing
so we will consider in particular those categories of tax most relevant to the basic question
                                                     
8 Profil, 12 October 1998, p. 16. A list of 46 major tax defaulters identified by the Federal Administration of Insol-
vency Matters in 1995 included three from the M&M sector. Kommersant, 7 September 1995, p. 3.
9 Data taken from Russian Federal Tax Service, 1997.
10 Government data on tax payments are collected by the tax ministry. The data are then distributed to relevant agen-
cies of the executive and legislative branch but they are not published.
11 Kommersant, 30 March 2000, p. 2; 7 April 2000, p. 5.
Russian Federation M&M sector M&M sector as % of RF
Total indebtedness 259.01 10.28 3.97
of which federal 160.03 6.12 3.82
Total arrears 235.58 7.68 3.26
of which federal 148.98 4.97 3.34
of which - profits tax 19.89 0.49 2.46
- VAT 107.74 4.02 3.73
- resource taxes 4.88 0.37 7.58
Total deferred 23.43 2.6 11.10
of which federal 11.05 1.15 10.41
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posed in this paper: is the M&M sector unreasonably taxed or does it avoid its responsibilities
through the tax system and indeed constitute a key part of bandit capitalism?
Table 4: The tax obligations by category of tax of the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation and the enter-
prises of the M&M sector, %
Type of tax M&M sector RF budget
Taxes on goods and services 13.2 27.2
Taxes on profit 10.0 26.2
Assets taxes 18.7 5.3
Natural resource taxes 6.0 5.2
Road fund 13.5 5.5
Social funds 29.9 23.6
Others 8.7 7.0
Source: Metally Evrazii, no. 6, 1997, p. 25.
Table 5. Tax payments by the M&M sector into the federal budget, billion new roubles12
Type of tax 1995 1996 1997
Assets tax 1.5 2.8 2.8
Profits tax 6.2 1.6 1.0
VAT 1.5 1.3 1.4
Resource taxes 0.3 0.3 0.3
Source: Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 7-8, 1998, p. 6.
VAT
While VAT rates varied somewhat through the decade the generally ruling rate was 20%, of
which 15% went to the federal budget and 5% to the regional budget. The M&M sector claims
to be particularly hard hit by the way in which VAT is levied at each stage of the production
process in what is described as a sector with a multi-stage production process. It is claimed that
metals production has eight or more stages at which VAT is levied, a problem which obviously
becomes more serious the further one moves down the production chain.13 More specifically, it
is noted that the levying of VAT on even in-house repair and refitting work adds appreciably to
the cost of technological upgrades.14
To determine whether the metals industry is indeed more multi-staged than other industrial
sectors requires a degree of technical knowledge of production processes which is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, one wonders whether the making of metals is any more multi-
staged and value-adding than the production process in other advanced industrial sectors. Be-
yond that it is necessary to remember that a large proportion of the sectors production is ex-
ported, and that the VAT on goods shipped for export is refundable. Indeed, until 2000 metals
processed and exported under tolling schemes had no VAT levied on them at all.15 At the end of
1999 the highly controversial tolling schemes were ended in the sense that VAT was now
payable, but it became refundable once the fact of export could be proven through trade docu-
mentation. The change certainly added to the sectors financing costs, and given the tax
                                                     
12 The table in the original source uses trillions of roubles as the unit of measurement. This was before the currency
reform which removed three zeros from the Russian monetary unit.
13 Finansovye Izvestiia, 16 May 1996, p. 2.
14 Metally Evrazii, no. 6, 2000, p. 19.
15 Tolling is a process, relatively widespread in the metals sector throughout the world, by which a metals producer
processes ore for a fee, rather than purchasing it on its own account. It is has been very widely used in the Russian
aluminium industry, particularly by traders importing bauxite or alumina for processing in Russia, with the resulting
metal being immediately re-exported. The process is seen as having provided enormous opportunities for tax avoid-
ance within Russia. Ekspert, 25 October 1999, pp. 10-11.
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authorities willingness to withhold refunds on arbitrary grounds, in an unpredictable way. But
the situation remains that much of the sectors final added value is ultimately VAT free.
Given that, and doubts about how multi-staged the sector really is, it is not surprising that the
data, such as they are, do not support the claim of S. V. Kolpakov of the International Union of
Metallurgists that the sector pays more than double the VAT typical of the economy as a
whole.16 Table 4 shows that only 13.2% of the taxes paid by the M&M sector are taxes on
goods and services, as against 27.2% for the economy as a whole. More recent data, official
1999 tax statistics, cannot be used in any comparative or longitudinal way, because of the re-
fund problem mentioned above. Nevertheless it can be pointed out that, according to those data,
in 1999 such resource sectors as oil extraction, gas and forestry paid as federal VAT RUR 11.21
billion, RUR 5.15 billion and RUR 1.36 billion respectively. Processing sectors such as machine
tools and the food sector paid RUR 168.61 billion and RUR 14.69 billion respectively. In 1997
the metals sector paid RUR 1.4 billion roubles. The comparison is very rough and ready, but it
does not suggest an overwhelming VAT burden.
Profits tax
Profits tax through most of the 1990s was levied at 13% for federal payments and up to 22% at
the regional level. It can be seen from Table 6 that it is one of the most volatile components of
the sectors tax liability, obviously because of the volatility of profits in the sector.
Table 6. Profits and profits tax paid by the M&M sector, billion roubles
1995 1996 1997
Profitability, % 18.4 5.8 4.0
Gross profits 19.1 7.4 5.7
Taxable profits 17.6 4.6 2.9
Profits tax 6.2 1.6 1.0
of which to federal budget 2.3 0.6 0.4
Source: Chernaia metallurgiia, nos 3-4, 1997, p. 6.
By 1999 the profits tax paid by the sector into the federal budget had rebounded to RUR 9.76
billion.17 Clearly profits within the sector fluctuate greatly from product to product according to
market conditions, with prices for commodity metals always being highly volatile and variable
across the sector. Russian exporters have also found themselves susceptible to anti-dumping
actions, with dramatic effects on export volumes to major markets.18 However, the blame for the
collapse in profitability sector-wide after 1995 is attached primarily to the so-called rouble
corridor, introduced in that year. The rouble corridor was a declared policy of the government
and Central Bank to maintain the value of the rouble against the US dollar within a broad and
only gently declining band. Until August 1998 the policy was successfully maintained, not least
because domestic inflation was brought under some sort of control. However, the relatively
strong rouble had a major negative effect on the M&M sector, given its by now overwhelming
dependence on exports.19 This was particularly the case for metal producers facing large price
increases in such major cost categories as power and transport. It is claimed that through 1995
                                                     
16 Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 7-8, 1998, p. 4.
17 Official government data (unpublished).
18 Fortescue, Stephen: The mining and metals industry and globalisation, in: Klaus Segbers (ed.): Explaining Post-
Soviet Patchworks, vol. 1, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001, pp. 136-163.
19 Russia has a 10% share of world ferrous metal exports, and 16.4% of non-ferrous exports. In 1999 metal exports
represented 20-22% of Russia's total exports, with ferrous shipments worth $US6 billion and non-ferrous $US7.6
billion. These values were down on 1998, but a strong upturn was evident in 2000. For many of the largest Russian
metal producers exports take up to 80% of their output. Metallurg, no. 6, 2000, pp. 3-5; no. 12, 2000, p. 11; Chernaia
metallurgiia, no. 4, 2001, p. 4.
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the rouble declined in value against the dollar by 130%, providing a major boost for exporters
rouble receipts. However over the same period inflation was 231%, with the price increases for
power and transport being at even higher rates.20
The August 1998 crisis brought with it a massive devaluation of the rouble, a development
which greatly improved the sectors profitability, both through the direct effect on its rouble
receipts and through some increase in domestic demand throughout the economy. The positive
effects on the governments profits tax receipts are evident.
While there is logic and some validity to the exchange rate explanation of the volatility of the
sectors profitability and profits tax payments, there is also a suspicion among many commen-
tators - and even more tax officials - that there is a high level of tax evasion in this category
within the M&M sector. Although the figures are taken from a time when the rouble corridor
was in operation and the sectors profits could well have been legitimately reduced, one notes
from Table 4 that in the mid-1990s profits tax represented 10.0% of the sectors tax burden as
against 26.2% of the tax burden of the economy as a whole.
Because the sector is so export-oriented, it has enormous opportunities to engage in transfer
pricing to the benefit of trading intermediaries, in order to strip assets in the most rapacious
cases and in all cases to reduce liability to profits tax, as well as VAT. Metal is sold at cost or
below to traders with close ownership links with the producer enterprise and invariably regis-
tered offshore. The profits remain offshore, taxed at vastly below their real rate (the producer
makes no or minimal profit and so pays no profit tax, VAT is levied on a greatly undervalued
transaction between producer and trader).21 One notes in this regard the strong presence in the
M&M sector from the very beginning of privatization of traders, both domestic and interna-
tional;22 one also notes that the first thing any new owners of a metal producer do is annul the
trading contracts signed by their predecessors. The tax authorities have tried to impose imputed
profit values, something clearly designed to overcome tax-evading transfer pricing, but some-
thing which also leaves considerable opportunity for arbitrary decisions by tax authorities.23 The
provisions for imputed profits in the old Tax Code have been removed in the new Code. How-
ever extra tax can still be charged if goods have been sold at more than 30% below market
price.24
Assets tax25
It is presumably at least partly because of the tax-avoidance opportunities in the profits tax cate-
gory, that the Russian tax system puts heavy emphasis on taxes that do not depend on profits,
most strikingly assets tax. The tax, variable according to the nature of the business holding the
assets, is generally levied at the maximum of 2% of taxable assets.26 As can be seen from Table
5, between 1995 and 1997 assets taxes paid by the sector increased significantly while profits
                                                     
20 Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 3-4, 1997, p. 7.
21 For specific accusations, although accusations that have never moved to the stage of legal action, see the Audit
Chambers case against the Novosibirsk Electrode Company and its owners Siberian-Urals Aluminium (SUAL), and
then Minister for Taxation Pochinoks threats against the tax-evading trading operations of Severstal in particular.
Ekspert, 17 May 1999, p. 35; Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt, no. 4, 1997, p. 10. We have already mentioned the failure of
the tax authorities to refund VAT payments where they believe the value of exports to have been undervalued.
22 Fortescue: Russian mining and metals sector, pp. 218-21.
23 Metally Evrazii, no. 6, 1997, p. 26.
24 Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 5-6, 1999, p. 74.
25 Nalogi na imushchestvo is often translated as property tax. I have preferred to retain that translation for nalogi na
nedvizhimost.
26 Some changes to the tax obligations and interrelationships of budgets at different levels, Presidential decree No.
2270, 22 December 1993, as amended, art. 13. Taken here from Federalnye nalogi, Agentstvo Biznes-inform, Mos-
cow, 1995, p. 12.
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taxes plummeted and VAT remained steady. Table 4 shows that assets tax made up a considera-
bly greater share of the M&M sectors tax burden, at 18.7%, than the 5.3% for the economy as a
whole, a reflection of the capital-intensive nature of the sector. In 1997 the tax paid on assets
was only slightly below the total taxable profits of the whole sector.27 Unfortunately more re-
cent government data provide no figures on assets taxes.
Not surprisingly there are regular complaints about a tax which can be charged at very high
levels even to enterprises which are loss-making. It is claimed that the tax is particularly bur-
densome for the struggling mining sector, since mining operations require particularly high
levels of fixed assets, and that such assets are likely to be greater in enterprises facing difficult
geological or geographical conditions and so already burdened with higher costs.28
Related to concern about the assets tax is discussion of Russian depreciation rates. Commenta-
tors claim with increasing urgency over the years, that the real rate of depreciation in the Rus-
sian M&M sector is somewhere around 1% per annum, as against over 10% in Russias indus-
trialized competitors.29 Despite its low level, depreciation is nevertheless one of the few and
major sources of investment in the sector.30 The depreciation problem has become acute as in-
flation has eaten away at the value of assets. And yet if assets are revalued to enable more real-
istic depreciation, firms liability to assets tax increases dramatically.31
Resource taxes
Another set of taxes which are payable regardless of the profitability of the enterprise are re-
source taxes, something by which the miners are seen as being particularly hard hit. There is a
straight resource royalty. Royalties are charged for search, exploration and extraction rights,
the amount payable being determined separately for each specific deposit. Search rights are
granted for 1-2% of the cost of the work done; exploration rights for 3-5% of exploration costs;
and extraction rights for 2-4% of the sales price of the metal produced from the extracted min-
erals.32 The proceeds are divided 25% to the federal budget, 25% to the regional budget and
50% to the local budget.
The other, and seemingly more controversial, resource tax is the so-called Replenishment of the
Raw Material Base Levy, often referred to as the geology fee. Introduced in February 1993,
the Levy is payable only on deposits which have been discovered and investigated at state ex-
pense, although one imagines that that would cover all currently exploited and most listed re-
serve deposits.33 The Levy is set at between 3.7% and 10% of realized production, the rate de-
pending on the type of ore being exploited. It is payable over the life of a deposit.34 The money
collected, which is divided between the federal and regional authorities, is supposed to be spent
on geological prospecting and exploration work, although it is claimed that it is not.35 According
                                                     
27 Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 7-8, 1998, p. 6.
28 Metallurg, no. 3, 1996, p. 5; Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 5-6, 1997, p. 8; Gornyi zhurnal, no. 3, 1999, p. 62.
29 Chernaia metallurgiia, no. 4, 1999, p. 63; Metally Evrazii, no. 1, 2001, p. 19.
30 Gornyi zhurnal, no. 3, 1999, p. 63.
31 Metally Evrazii, no. 6, 2000, p. 19.
32 Amendments and additions to the Law of the Russian Federation On sub-surface resources, Federal Law No.
27-FZ, 3 March 1995 (Sobranie zakonodatelstva, no. 10, 1995, item 823).
33 The procedures for the Levy are set out in Procedures for the use of levies for the replenishment of the mineral
raw material base and the exemption of raw material users from such levies, implemented by government decree No.
597, 17 May 1996, Sobranie zakonodatelstva, no. 21, 1996, art. 2518.
34 Metallurg, nos. 11-12, 1993, pp. 7-9; Gornyi zhurnal, no. 8, 2000, p. 4; Metally Evrazii, no. 6, 1997, p. 43. The
Procedures allow for an exemption from the Levy to be obtained once the deposit user has paid off all the costs
incurred by the state. However the Levy itself cannot be counted as part of the payment of such costs. Point 18 of the
Procedures.
35 Kommersant, 13 October 2000, p. 4.
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to the Procedures governing the Levy it is possible for money from it to be given to private
firms to undertake their own geological and prospecting work; however the author has no in-
formation on whether such transfers are in fact made.
Also included in the resource tax category are tailings taxes, on which little information is
available but which it is claimed are particularly injurious to low-grade operators, since they
produce higher volumes of tailings.36 Indeed mining representatives claim that the Russian tax
system is generally inappropriate for the Russian mining sector, in which the great majority of
deposits are low grade. It is said that the system would be more appropriate for a mining indus-
try characterized by high-grade ores such as Australias.37
In the mid-1990s the sectors resource tax payments were steady at around RUR 300 million per
annum, with the taxes share of the overall tax burden roughly the same as for the economy as a
whole (Table 4). However later in the 1990s the level of payments increased sharply, reaching
RUR 1.6 billion in 1999.38 Those payments by the M&M sector can be compared to the RUR
4.12 billion paid by the oil extraction sector, RUR 1.48 billion by the gas sector, and RUR 385
million by the forestry sector in 1999. Further increases were budgeted for in the 2001 budget.39
Critics of the resources tax burden on miners claim that it is helping produce a crisis in the sec-
tor. The Levy in particular, designed to fund geological work and ensure the adequacy of min-
eral reserves, is in fact having the opposite effect. The state which collects the money has nei-
ther the will nor the capacity to spend it on its stated purpose; the mining enterprises them-
selves, who in a market economy one would expect to fund their own geological work, have no
money, not least because of the tax burden they bear. The result is a looming major minerals
deficit.40
Road and transport tax
Although the mining sector is particularly upset about its liability to resources taxes, it did in the
mid-1990s represent the smallest tax category in Table 4. It is overshadowed by one innocuous
sounding tax category, road and transport tax. In Table 4 it makes up 13.5% of the M&M sec-
tors tax burden, as against 6.0% for resource taxes and 5.5% for the economy as a whole.41 The
data suggest that complaints that this tax discriminates against the sector, with its need to shift
bulk loads over long distances, have some validity. The tax is 2.5% of gross revenue (minus
VAT), with 0.5% going to the Federal Road Fund and 2.0% to the regional fund.
Social fund payments
Another even bigger burden for the sector, although not one from which it suffers significantly
more than other sectors, are various social fund payments. According to Table 4, such payments
represent 29.9% of the tax burden and are made to the Pension Fund (28% of the wages fund,
reduced to 20.6% in March 1999), the Social Insurance Fund (5.4% of the wages fund), the
Federal Employment Fund (2.0% of the wages fund), and compulsory health insurance (3.6% of
the wages fund).42
                                                     
36 Gornyi zhurnal, no. 3, 1999, p. 62.
37 Gornyi zhurnal, no. 3, 1999, p. 63.
38 Unpublished government data; Gornyi zhurnal, no. 7, 1998, p. 4.
39 Metallurg, no. 9, 2000, p. 7.
40 Gornyi zhurnal, no. 3, 1999, p. 62; Tsvetnye metally, no. 10, 1999, pp. 4-8.
41 One 1996 source stated that road and transport levies took 14.9% of profits. Delovoi mir, 24 April 1996, p. 1.
42 Metallurg, nos. 11-12, 1993, pp. 7-9; Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 5-6, 1999, p. 74.
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It is a burden that depends on the size of the workforce and the level of wages paid. Although
the M&M workforce has been cut during transition, the decline has been nothing like the
workforce cuts during the restructuring of the Western metals sector in the 1970s and 1980s.43
The sector, particularly among the non-ferrous producers, pays above-average wages,44 some-
thing reflected in the sectors slightly higher than average social fund burden.
Export duties
Although not strictly speaking a tax and not included in tax statistics, export duties have become
a major and volatile part of the M&M sectors government-imposed cost structure. They clearly
affect the price and therefore competitiveness of Russian metal producers on world markets.
They are levied for two declared reasons: to raise revenue, and as a policy instrument to reduce
levels of exports and thereby increase the supply of metal to domestic buyers.45 In the wake of
the August 1998 crisis revenue-raising duties were introduced by the Primakov government,
comprising 5% on ferrous products and primary aluminium and up to 10% on copper, zinc and
nickel. The duties have been subject to constant adjustment and temporary withdrawal, but are
still seen as a legitimate form of revenue raising.
Regulatory export duties have been applied above all to ferrous and particularly non-ferrous
scrap exports. Set for some time at 20%, there has been considerable pressure from domestic
metal producers to raise them to 50%.46 Producers claim to have been hard hit by shortages and
high prices for scrap as ever-increasing amounts are exported. It is one issue which, in terms of
the sectoral lobbying to be described in the second part of this paper, splits the sector, with the
influential scrap enterprises pushing hard for the removal of the duties.47 Not surprisingly, nev-
ertheless, the producers won the day, and the official position of the sector is for the imposi-
tion of high regulatory duties.48
Local taxes
Most of the data and commentary in this paper concern federal taxes. However probably more
than half of the total taxes paid by M&M enterprises are paid to regional and local authorities.
As seen above, Russias regions receive a share of a number of federally collected taxes, in-
cluding VAT and resource royalties. Only about 40% of profits tax goes to the federal budget.49
Regional and local authorities collect a further vast range of taxes and charges which vary
greatly from locality to locality. They include levies on housing and social-cultural facilities,
and for the provision of police and municipal services. It should be noted that electricity tariffs,
                                                     
43 The workforce in the Russian ferrous sector declined from 772,000 in 1991 to 673,000 in 1997. Among US inte-
grated steel producers employment levels have dropped by over 75% since restructuring began in the mid-1970s.,
Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 1-2, 2000, p. 9; Ahlbrandt, Roger S. /. Fruehan, Richard J, / Giarratani, Frank: The Ren-
aissance of American Steel. Lessons for managers in competitive industries, Oxford University Press, New York and
Oxford, 1996, p. 24.
44 In November 1998 non-ferrous wages were 2.25 times average (fourth highest sector) and ferrous wages were
24.5% above average. Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 3-4, 1999, p. 12.
45 Andrei Kushnirenko, head of the tariff policy department of the Ministry of Trade, refers to the fiscal and regula-
tory functions of export duties. A trade ministry to raise export tax on some commodities, in: Inside-news, 19 No-
vember 1999, citing Reuters, Moscow, 18 November 1999.
46 Kommersant, 15 April 2000, p. 5.
47 See the debate at the 1999 Duma conference on the metals industry. Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt, no. 2, 1999, pp. 14-
26.
48 See the position of Shevtsov, the head of metals department of the Ministry of Economics, in: Vedomosti, 23 Sep-
tember 1999, p. B4.
49 Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 7-8, 1998, p. 6.
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imposed by local suppliers under the influence of regional governments, are openly described as
a form of taxation, and indeed at times as a punitive tax.50
It should also be remembered that large M&M enterprises make up a major proportion of the
tax revenues of a region or locality. Thus in 1999 the Norilsk Nickel Combine contributed 53%
of the tax revenues of Krasnoiarsk region, 88% of those of the city of Norilsk, and 75% of
those of the Taimyr Autonomous Region.51 This makes such enterprises of enormous sensitivity
for local leaders, with regional governors in particular being able and willing to deal very
sternly with enterprise owners who are not paying their way.52 Nevertheless governors still
struggle to get their full measure, as can be seen from figures for Sverdlovsk region, run by the
tough Eduard Rossel. There in 1998 nearly 50% of profits and over 60% of industrial profits
made in the region came from the metals sector. However the sector provided only 21.5% of
corporate taxes, 42.7% of the total coming from industrial corporations.53
Who is milking whom?
Do these details on taxation in the M&M sector in the 1990s, as sketchy as they are, allow us to
come to any conclusions as to the nature of the Russian political economy? As an intended or
unintended consequence of its general economic reform policy, the government has reduced a
highly industrialized economy to a raw material appendage.54 Will it now be forced to rely on
the excessively high taxation of the resource sector in order to have any budget revenue at all?
While much of the focus of such analysis is on the oil and gas sector, it can be equally applied
to the M&M sector, including its implication that such excessive taxation will eventually, and
quite possibly sooner rather than later, destroy the goose that lays the golden eggs. That claim is
made particularly sharply with regard to the miners and the future of Russias mineral reserves.
Or is the Russian economy rather one where the resource sector, including M&M, has attracted,
because it is one of the few areas of the Russian economy with an export-oriented comparative
advantage, an unsavory collection of asset-stripping and influence-peddling entrepreneurs who
through their commercial activities and their ability to transform commercial gain into political
influence deprive the Russian state and people of a reasonable share of the proceeds from the
exploitation of the raw material assets of the country?
Hopefully without having to face such extreme possibilities, any taxation system has to find a
balance between a fair, just and socially efficient distribution of wealth and income among all
members of society, on the one hand, and allowing particular parts of society to retain a suffi-
cient proportion of the wealth and income they generate to provide both the incentive and the
resources to continue their wealth generation into the future, on the other.
                                                     
50 In 2000 the deputy chair of the board of United Energy Systems justified a mooted increase in electricity charges to
the aluminium industry on the grounds that because of tolling the industry had not been paying sufficient tax and that
UES deserved a cut from export earnings. Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt, no. 6, 2000, pp. 22-23.
51 Tsvetnye metally, no. 6, 2000, p. 9.
52 As evidence one need look only at the fate of Anatolii Bykov, a major shareholder in the Krasnoiarsk Aluminium
Factory, and now in prison on conspiracy to murder charges following a falling out with Krasnoiarsk governor Alek-
sandr Lebed. Mikhail Zhivilo had major interests in Siberian ferrous and non-ferrous metals until Kemerovo governor
Tuleev turned against him. He is in Paris fighting extradition proceedings on charges of conspiracy to murder the
governor. In both cases it is suggested the souring of relations was related to disagreements over the size of the cut of
enterprise profits the region and its governor were entitled to.
53 Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt, no. 1, 2000, p. 73.
54 Conservative opponents of Russian economic reforms during the 1990s, of whom Sergei Glazev is a prominent
representative, argue that those reforms have worked to destroy Russias industrial and technological capacity, leav-
ing the country with no choice but to rely on low value added resource exports, i.e. become a raw material append-
age of the industrialized world. See Fortescue, Stephen: Policy-Making for Russian Industry, Macmillan, Basing-
stoke and London, 1997, p. 28. For analysis of the technological downgrading of the sectors product range, see
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The combination of the particular complexity of those distributional issues in the Russian case
and the extreme opacity of the financial condition of the M&M sector ensures that on both
philosophical and practical grounds we will arrive at no single and correct answer to our ques-
tion, who is milking whom. Further, a full answer to the question requires a judgement as to
whether investment levels in key Russian economic sectors, generally seen as low, reflect enter-
prises stripped of cash required for investment by a rapacious government or by rapacious own-
ers. It is not, therefore, our intention here to answer the question fully, but rather to summarize
what the operations of the tax system tell us about the issue.
Firstly, the evidence does suggest grounds for complaint on the part of the mining component of
the M&M sector. It could be seen as particularly hard done by because of the focus on non-
profit related taxes, it being generally a low-profit sector. The assets tax burden seems inappro-
priate in the circumstances, particularly if it inhibits a generous depreciation regime.
Clearly if the Replenishment Levy is not being spent on what it is set aside for in the legislation,
the miners paying it have grounds for complaint. However that does raise the question of who
should most appropriately fund mineral exploration: the state, whether funded by a levy im-
posed on the mining sector or out of general revenue, or the sector directly? One hesitates to
assume that a mining sector more lightly taxed and left to its own devices would adequately
fund mineral exploration, but it is unlikely that it would do worse than todays state.
The data also suggest that the mining sector receives no favors in comparison with other re-
source sectors, particularly the gas industry. One might justify the resource-related taxes on
environmental grounds, and might also claim that to treat the sub-sector more generously would
be a form of subsidization of mining enterprises which in terms of ore quality and accessibility
are in fact not competitive. Nevertheless, overall the sub-sectors tax burden appears to be
heavy and such as to at least contribute to low profitability and lack of funds for its future de-
velopment. Those mining enterprises which are not moribund are very susceptible to takeover
by metal producing enterprises, suggesting that there is something wrong with their profitability
levels.
It is at the metal producer level that ownership in the M&M sector is concentrated, and it is
there that the most persistent accusations of tax evasion on a massive scale are made. One notes
with some sympathy the sectors volatile profitability and accepts that this could be based on
market volatility and exchange rate movements beyond the sectors control. However one also
notes the savage, at times literally murderous, struggles for control over assets which were at the
time being described as unprofitable. One also notes the levels of capital flight, some proportion
of which one strongly suspects comes from trading operations in metals. It could be said that
there is something suspicious about the level of both VAT and profits taxes in the metal sector.
But having said that, there is evidence, to be seen in Table 4 and other places, that even the
metal producing component of the M&M sector pays a disproportionate level of tax compared
to other sectors of the economy, primarily it would seem as a consequence of high assets tax
liabilities. While one appreciates the claims that assets taxes, in their discrimination against
capital-intensive industries and indifference to poor profitability, are unjust, in this particular
case they could well be offsetting some highly illegitimate behavior by their victims. The same
could be said of export duties. Nevertheless one could hope for a less arbitrary and longer-term
approach to solving the problems of bandit capitalism than the relatively arbitrary imposition
of non-performance related taxes.
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Recent changes to tax arrangements in the M&M sector
Regardless of how an outside commentator might see the reasonableness or otherwise of the
form and levels of taxation in the M&M sector, sector participants themselves have long made it
clear that they are unhappy and have lobbied hard for changes.
One assumes that there has been a degree of insider lobbying by powerful businesspeople with
political clout. Having said that, it should be recognized that there are few top-flight oligarchs in
the M&M sector. Potanin is the only classic example, moving from the financial sector to the
real economy with the generous assistance of the shares-for-credit deals in 1995. Potanin,
however, was unusual in moving into the M&M sector, specifically Norilsk Nickel. Generally
the M&M sector is owned by industry insiders, albeit of a post-Red Director generation. While
significant figures in the industry, they do not appear to have the financial clout and political
connections to operate at the highest oligarch levels. Only Oleg Deripaska has emerged from the
industry into something like oligarch status. Even before teaming up with an oil baron, Roman
Abramovich, he was powerful enough to push through the end of tolling, something the rest of
the aluminium industry had been resisting for a number of years.
Perhaps because the M&M ownership elite are not top-rank oligarchs, most of the sectors lob-
bying that we can discern has been undertaken by formal sectoral bodies and officials.
State sectoral bureaucratic agencies
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there have been regular restructurings and steady
downsizings of the state bureaucratic agency responsible for the M&M sector, the successor
body of the old Ministries of Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Metallurgy. From 1992 to 1997 the main
body was the Committee for Metallurgy (Kommet), although throughout that period there was
also a metals department within the Ministry of Economics, the direct descendent of the metals
department of the old Gosplan.55 When Kommet was abolished, the Ministry of Economics unit,
under the name Department for the Economics of the Metallurgical Complex (DEMK), became
the sole sectoral agency in the central bureaucracy. Most recently the new Ministry for Industry,
Science and Technology has within it a Department of Metallurgy.56 It is unclear whether any
unit remains in the Ministry of Economics.57
These agencies have invariably presented themselves as above all lobbyists for the sector, thus
publicly opposing the rouble corridor, supporting tolling and pushing for tax changes. One
might apply to M&M state agencies the claim, made in the context of Russias widespread cor-
ruption, that ambitious tycoons have managed to acquire entire ministries.58
Peak associations
There are a large number of sectoral trade and business associations. Some, such as Alumin-
ium and Rudprom (Ore industry), have their origins in the glavki (sectoral administrations) of
the old Soviet Ministries of Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Metallurgy. Others are post-Soviet crea-
tions, closer in form to Western sectoral trade associations. The Association of Industrialists of
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the Mining-Metallurgical Complex of Russia (AMROS) has official corporatist status, repre-
senting the employers in tri-partite negotiations with the government and the sectors trade un-
ion. It is headed by A. V. Sysoev, a long-time aluminium industry insider and general director
of the Bogoslovo Aluminium Factory. He is willing to express very Red Directorish views
while operating in the classic post-Soviet sector.59 He is one of the most persistent spokesper-
sons for the sector, with changes to the tax system being among his most urgent demands.
Other associations include the International Union of Metallurgists, headed by Serafim Kolpa-
kov, the last Soviet Minister of Metallurgy; the Union of Metal Product Exporters, headed by
Serafim Afonin, another senior ministry official of the Soviet era; the Russian Association of
Metals Traders; and a whole range of sub-sectoral associations. The views of all these bodies
tend to correspond closely with those of the sectoral state agency, with the exception mentioned
above of the scrap metal association regarding scrap metal export duties.
Academic commentators
A feature of Soviet policy making was the use of academic research institutes as a source of
policy studies, proposals and commentaries. It is a tradition which has not completely disap-
peared, with the major relevant institutes in the M&M sector being the Institute of Economics of
the Central Research Institute for Ferrous Metallurgy and the Central Research Institute for
Non-Ferrous Metallurgy. One wonders who wrote the virtually identical discussions of the
shortcomings of natural resource legislation in two issues of Gornyi zhurnal. The first to appear,
in early 1999, was signed by A. I. Sukhoruchenkov, the general director of Rudprom, and his
deputy V. G. Evsin. The second appeared in mid-2000, signed by Professor M. E. Pevzner of
one of the sectors research institutions.60 Despite the later appearance of his version one sus-
pects that Pevzner is the author.
As far as taxation is concerned the full array of lobbyists has been used. Academics from the
two institutes mentioned above as well as many others publish articles in the specialized press.
Anatolii Sysoev regularly writes on taxation issues, as do Shevelev of DEMK and Kolpakov of
the International Union of Metallurgists. Officials and industry representatives sit together in
such consultative bodies as the Coordination Council of the Metals Sector, set up by DEMK
with leading enterprise, institute and association executives as members.61 In 1999 AMROS,
with its corporatist partner, the Mining-Metallurgical Trade Union of Russia, lobbied for tax
reductions, including sending a draft decree to the government entitled On measures for the
optimization of the tax obligations of mining enterprises in the metals industry, a document
which also had the support of the governors of the Sverdlovsk and Murmansk regions.62 The
DEMK included a list of tax proposals in its document Prospects for the development of the
metals industry up to 2005.63 It has to be said that there has been no sign of those documents
appearing in or as specific government decrees. However some of the proposals contained in
them and their general tenor are evident in the new Tax Code which has been prepared in recent
years.
The Tax Code, as a major piece of legislation, has to pass through parliament. The draft Code
was considered by the Dumas Committee for Industry, Construction and High Technologies.
Over 10,000 comments and proposed amendments were submitted to the Committee, including
from AMROS, the International Union of Metallurgists and DEMK. For the consideration of
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61 Chernaia metallurgiia, nos. 5-6, 1998, p. 89.
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these amendments, as they related to the M&M sector, the Committee constituted an Expert
Committee for Metallurgy and the Mining Industry, chaired by A. Skoch, the deputy general
director of the Lebedinsk Mining Combine.64
As part of the lobbying over the new code, industry representatives called most persistently for
general reductions in profits and assets taxes, including the introduction of fixed upper limits to
the amount of tax payable;65 the increased use of differentiated rates according to the particular
circumstances of the enterprise or sector;66 a shift from the assets tax to a property tax;67 a shift
from VAT to a wholesale turnover tax, or failing that, at least the removal from the VAT net of
construction and refitting work done within the enterprise;68 and changes to depreciation rates.69
Tax changes
The overall strategy of Putins tax reform has been a reduction in the tax burden and simplifica-
tion of the tax system in order to encourage greater compliance. This is most evident in a low
and flat income tax. The corporate sector has also gained from tax reductions, for example prof-
its tax was reduced from 35% to 30% in September 1999.70 The simplification is also evident in
the replacement of the three main social fund taxes (Pensions, Social Insurance and Health) by a
single social tax, although as shown in the relevant paragraphs of the new Tax Code, the sin-
gle tax still contains separate rates for each fund.71 The sliding scales of the new rates, rates
which apparently Putin wants further reduced,72 makes it difficult to calculate how much of a
saving they will represent for the sector. One commentator suggests as a minimum 2.9%.73 It is
curious that the social fund payments have never been a focus of industry complaints or lobby-
ing, despite their high proportion of the overall tax burden.
The sector has achieved a small victory with the acceptance in the new Code of the removal of
VAT from internal self-funded repair work.74 However this seems less than the requested VAT
relief on self-funded building and installation work, including mine development workings.75
The sector was not able to win VAT exemptions for the import of domestically unavailable
equipment, much less any hint of a move from VAT to a wholesale turnover tax. Interestingly
the new Code would seem to reinstate the zero VAT rating for the processing of products under
customs regimes, i.e. for tolling.76
The sector is promised tax relief in the future in areas that will be of particular benefit to the
miners. The road fund is to be abolished from 1 January 2003, although it is pointed out by one
commentator that it will actually increase in the meantime.77 The other big irritant for the min-
ing industry, the Replenishment Levy, was also slated for abolition in Putins original special
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tax message to the Duma and the Ministry of Finances subsequent commentary.78 The gov-
ernment apparently intends soon to send to the Duma the chapters of the new Tax Code dealing
with resource taxes, with a single tax to replace the current royalty and Replenishment Levy. It
is said that the new tax will be based on a halving of the current Replenishment Levy and a
newly calculated royalty element.79
The area where it is recognized that the greatest benefit could come to the sector is the assets
tax. There would have to be change in this area if the prediction of Sergei Shatalov, first deputy
Minister of Finance, that the tax changes will lead to a redistribution of the tax burden away
from capital intensive sectors such as the metals industry were to be realized.80 Putin originally
promised that the assets tax would be replaced with a property tax.81 That, if and depending on
how it were to be implemented, could indeed make a difference for M&M enterprises, and
would also make feasible a more attractive depreciation policy. There is, however, no sign at
this stage that Putins proposal is proceeding.
Another key aspect of Putins tax reform is an attempt to shift tax revenues from the regions to
the federal center. That does not necessarily mean, of course, any reduction in the tax burden,
but enterprises that dominate their regions, as many in the M&M sector do, might feel that they
would be better off under a more distant tax collector more likely to impose uniform tax rates
across the country. However one already sees signs that enterprises might end up paying more
taxes to the center, but without being able to get away with reduced payments to the regions. In
April 2001 the Belgorod regional government, which under the tax reforms was due to have its
share of taxes collected in the region cut from 65% to 52%, signed an agreement with the Sto-
ilen Mining Combine that the latter will pay a guaranteed RUR 188 million to the administra-
tion in 2001, RUR 11 million more than the previous year. The agreement included a commit-
ment from the enterprise to support a whole range of the administrations social programs as
well as a diversified investment program.82 One doubts that a Putin tax reform and even his
regional political changes will be enough to get regional and local governments off enterprises
backs.
It is still too early to come to firm conclusions on the effect of the tax changes on the M&M
sector. The consequences of changes already legislated are not yet clear, to say nothing of
mooted changes that have not yet appeared in legislation. Neither is it easy to determine
whether the changes will affect the who is milking whom question. So far it is the changes that
have been promised but not yet implemented that would bring the greatest benefits, particularly
to the mining sector - a move from the assets tax, the abolition of the Replenishment Levy and
the road tax. Only if those are implemented could one see the shift in the tax burden away from
the capital-intensive sector predicted by Sergei Shatalov. While the capital intensive sector is
not the same thing as the resource sector, those are the changes nevertheless that would be
needed to address the hypothesized scenario, that the resource sector, the M&M sector included,
is being so heavily milked by the state through its tax system that the cow is in danger of going
dry.
If however the situation is rather one of the sector draining away the wealth of the nation, the
mooted changes would make things worse. It certainly would not meet the demands of more
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conservative economists that the tax burden on the resource sector be increased.83 The stated
aim of the reform is to encourage a higher level of tax compliance through the introduction of a
more reasonable tax system. One doubts very much whether the carrot offered is enough to
convert high-level tax evaders into model taxpayers, particularly when there are no signs of a
more effective stick being deployed. While the single social tax might reduce the level of tax-
avoiding employment and remuneration practices, those are relatively marginal issues within
the M&M sector. The cuts in profits tax are unlikely to have any effect on the incentives to re-
duce the levels of declared profits. There is nothing in the new Tax Code or any other sphere of
government activity to suggest that Putins much vaunted anti-oligarch stick is to be used
against transfer pricing and capital flight.84 While one notes the Dumas recent acceptance on
the first reading of a government-sponsored bill on money laundering,85 it is overwhelmed in
symbolic and practical terms by Putins distressingly selective anti-oligarch campaign, the total
lack of action with regard to inadequate corporate governance, the apparent immunity of shad-
owy offshore trading companies, and the continuing high levels of capital flight. These are not
things that can be dealt with by a tax system alone, but the current tax changes appear to have
minimal regard for them anyway. It might be going too far to see tax reform as a victory for the
resource-based oligarchs, but it is even harder to see it as a contribution to their taming.
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